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ABSTRACT
Elections are the main instrument through which voters can exercise inﬂuence
over public policy. However, the relationship between electoral outcomes and
government policy performance is under-researched. In particular, little is
known about the eﬀect that the perceived narrowness of electoral victories
has on expectations about incumbents’ policy behaviour. Drawing on the
literature on electoral mandates and framing theory, we examine how the
way in which election results are portrayed by the media aﬀects citizens’
conﬁdence that winners will enact their policy programmes, using the 2015
UK election as a case study. Based on a survey experiment conducted after
the race, we ﬁnd that victories depicted as narrow increased scepticism about
the incoming government’s ability to deliver on its promises, contradicting
normative theories of electoral competition. Instead, and consistent with
mandate interpretations, subjects – especially less political knowledgeable
ones – became more likely to trust in the government’s ability to fulﬁl its
campaign pledges when the Conservative victory was presented as decisive.
Besides shedding light on the link between the framing of election results
and expectations about government performance, our results have potentially
relevant implications for understanding how such expectations may aﬀect
actual policy-making and the enforcement of accountability.
Introduction
Normative theories of democracy contend that competitive elections help
translate citizens’ preferences into government action. Ferejohn (1986), for
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instance, argues that incumbents have incentives to implement the policies
preferred by the electorate because of their fear of being replaced in the
next election. To the extent that close elections provide a signal about the
competitiveness of future races and induce greater uncertainty about oﬃce-
holders’ re-election prospects, narrow electoral victories should encourage
incumbents to enact the policies that got them into oﬃce and by which
they will be retrospectively rewarded or punished (Hobolt and Klemmensen
2008; Vowles, Katz, and Stevens 2017). The threat of removal becomes less
credible following less competitive elections yielding larger majorities for
the winner, who may feel relatively safe from electoral punishment and
thus less pressured to enact the policies promised to the citizenry.
An alternative perspective on the relationship between election results and
government policy-making is posited by the mandate theory of elections
(Grossback, Peterson, and Stimson 2006). In this view, tight races without a
clear winner undermine the in-party’s power to deliver on its campaign com-
mitments, as policy-making may become subject to a complex post-electoral
bargaining process among multiple parties that could end up diluting the
government’s programme (Powell 2000). In contrast, decisive victories result-
ing in uniﬁed partisan control over policy-making render it easier for incum-
bents to fulﬁl their manifesto pledges without the need to make policy
compromises.
Although the relationship between the decisiveness of incumbents’ elec-
toral victory and governments’ ability to fulﬁl their policy promises has
been the subject of much theoretical debate, empirical studies on this issue
are relatively scarce, and their ﬁndings remain largely inconclusive (Hobolt
and Klemmensen 2008; Pickup and Hobolt 2015). Even less academic atten-
tion has been paid to the inﬂuence that public perceptions about the magni-
tude of the in-party’s victory exert on expectations about the government’s
policy performance, even when such expectations can be as important in con-
ditioning the behaviour of political actors as the actual electoral outcomes
(Mendelsohn 1988; Shamir, Shamir, and Sheafer 2008). This paper aspires to
bridge this gap in the literature, examining how alternative media interpret-
ations about the decisiveness of the electoral victory aﬀect people’s beliefs
about the policy performance of incoming governments. To this end, we
draw on framing theory and research on electoral mandates to analyse the
results of a survey experiment conducted in the aftermath of the 2015 UK
general election.
The 2015 British election makes an excellent case study to test whether –
and to what extent – the way in which electoral victories are perceived or por-
trayed inﬂuences citizens’ conﬁdence that incumbents will enact their policy
programme. The Conservative Party victory on 7 May 2015 could be inter-
preted as “decisive”, having produced a majority against all expectations,
but also – and equally credibly – as “narrow”, as such a majority was relatively
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small in historical terms and arguably left the incoming administration little
room for manoeuvre. Indeed, whereas some press reports described the
Tory majority as “slender” (BBC, May 8, 2015) or “slim” (The Independent,
May 26, 2015), others depicted the result as a “crushing victory” (The Daily
Mail, May 8, 2015) for David Cameron, conveying a “strong endorsement
from the electorate” (The Telegraph, May 8, 2015). Diﬀerent interpretations
of the electoral outcome were accompanied by diﬀerent readings of the
policy implications of the new political landscape. At the same time that
The Telegraph readers learned that the Prime Minister’s party would “have a
free hand” to craft policy (The Telegraph, May 8, 2015), The Economist (May
9, 2015) reported that Cameron would ﬁnd little support to push a divisive
government programme.
During our experiment, conducted three weeks after the election, we pre-
sented subjects with news articles portraying the Tory victory as either deci-
sive or narrow and estimated the eﬀects of exposure to these competing
descriptions – moderated by individuals’ political and attitudinal character-
istics – on expectations about the government’s ability to honour its policy
commitments. Our results show that individuals were signiﬁcantly more
prone to believe that the in-party would be able to implement its policy pro-
gramme when the Conservative electoral victory was portrayed as decisive. By
contrast, victories depicted as narrow never boosted subjects’ conﬁdence that
incumbents would deliver on their campaign promises. Altogether, our
ﬁndings indicate that the mandate – rather than the normative or responsive-
ness – view of elections prevailed in the “voter’s eye” (Powell 2000, 7). The pre-
dominance of the mandate interpretation was particularly marked among
least politically knowledgeable individuals, who were especially sensitive to
the framing of the electoral outcome.
Electoral mandates and expectations about government policy-
making: previous research and hypotheses
Scholars have long established that the competitiveness of elections aﬀects
citizens’ political behaviours and attitudes. Closer races are associated with
higher turnout levels (Vowles, Katz, and Stevens 2017), better informed
voters (Altheas, Cizmar, and Gimpel 2009), heightened media attention (Ban-
ducci and Hanretty 2014) and higher (perceived) electoral legitimacy (Birch
2008).
Besides aﬀecting citizens’ political engagement and views about the
quality of democratic processes, the closeness of elections – and, more speciﬁ-
cally, the decisiveness or narrowness of incumbents’ victory – can also
inﬂuence public expectations about incoming governments’ policy perform-
ance and, in particular, people’s conﬁdence that elected oﬃcials will fulﬁl
their policy pledges. In principle, one would expect a strong overlap
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between the preferences of the electorate and the policies enacted by the
government. According to Powell (2000), this should be especially true follow-
ing elections with clear winners and large margins of victory. Such elections
may be seen as providing oﬃceholders with a mandate, i.e. a strong and
clear message from the citizenry endorsing the winner’s programme and
giving the in-party the policy-making resources to enact it.1
However, the actual achievement of a government majority and a large
size advantage are necessary but not suﬃcient conditions for a mandate.
As noted by Grossback, Peterson, and Stimson (2006), mandates are also a
matter of social construction and post-election interpretation. The way in
which electoral outcomes are framed and communicated to the public
plays a key role in forging expectations about what the winner can or
cannot do. Therefore, narratives – especially media-driven ones – that
succeed in persuading the citizenry that the in-party’s victory was decisive
will be more eﬀective in convincing the public opinion that the new govern-
ment has been given a mandate – and the political power – to carry out its
programme (Mendelsohn 1998; Shamir, Shamir, and Sheafer 2008).
In the context of the 2015 UK election, these arguments lead to the ﬁrst
hypothesis (H1) to be tested in our empirical analysis: exposure to narratives
describing the electoral result as a “decisive” (“narrow”) Tory victory should
render individuals more (less) likely to believe that the elected authorities will
be able to deliver on their election promises.
This ﬁrst hypothesis considers only the average eﬀect of the (perceived)
decisiveness of the winning party’s victory on expectations about the govern-
ment’s ability to carry out its policy programme. Nevertheless, a vast body of
research on framing theory and experimental public opinion suggests that rel-
evant individual characteristics are likely to moderate these eﬀects.
Firstly, party identiﬁcation, acting as a “perceptual screen” (Campbell et al.
1960, 133), has long been shown to condition the way in which people
process and evaluate political information. Consistent with this, the growing
literature on partisan motivated reasoning, drawing on general theories of
motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990), has established that individuals
aﬃliated with a political party respond to new information by making it ﬁt
their prior beliefs in order to rationalise arriving at speciﬁc conclusions
aligned with their partisan identity. Individuals tend to accept information
that is congruent with their political views irrespective of its objective accu-
racy, but discard or discount that which challenges their biases (Druckman,
Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014). Closely
related to the focus of our investigation, Sances and Stewart (2015) and
1The assumption here is that incumbents are committed to implementing their policy programme. Bara
(2005) ﬁnds that this holds true for the overwhelming majority of policies pledged by UK governments.
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Kernell and Mullinix (2018) ﬁnd that partisanship can colour the interpretation
of information about elections and perceptions of electoral outcomes.
Applied to the 2015 UK election, the logic underlying motivated reasoning
would lead us to expect supporters of the two major parties – Conservative
and Labour – to be more responsive to information aligned with the electoral
interests or narrative of their favoured party, and to dismiss information incon-
sistent with these views. That is, Conservative (Labour) identiﬁers should be
more likely to accept frames portraying the Tory victory as “decisive”
(“narrow”), and to downplay the opposite interpretation. Independents, in
turn, should respond to information about the election result as “rational
Bayesian updaters” (Lebo and Cassino 2007, 738), adjusting their expectations
about government performance according to the messages they were
exposed to. Combining H1 with the moderating inﬂuence of partisanship
on treatment eﬀects, we state our second hypothesis (H2): the positive
impact of “decisive victory” frames on expectations about the government’s
ability to deliver on its promises should be strongest among Conservatives and
weakest among Labour partisans, with the eﬀect for independents falling
between these two extremes. By contrast, “narrow victory” frames will have a
larger negative eﬀect among Labour supporters than among independents,
and should be least eﬀective in swaying the beliefs of Conservative identiﬁers.
Hypothesis H2 focuses on independents and subjects aﬃliated with the
incumbent and main opposition parties, as it is diﬃcult to draw expectations
about the moderating inﬂuence of partisanship for supporters of each of the
other contestants of the 2015 election (UKIP, the Scottish National Party, the
Liberal Democrats, etc.). Nonetheless, another version of the motivated
reasoning argument is that perceptions about electoral outcomes and post-
election attitudes depend not only on partisan identiﬁcation, but on
whether individuals voted for the party that won or for one of the “electoral
losers” (Anderson et al. 2005; Kernell and Mullinix2018).2 Following a logic
similar to that behind H2, subjects who voted for the Tories in 2015 should
be prone to take “decisive” frames – which highlight the in-party’s ability to
implement the policies these subjects endorsed at the polling booth – at
face value, and to ignore information portraying the Conservative victory as
“narrow”. The opposite would hold for participants who voted for any of
the other contenders. Hence, hypothesis H3 states that the eﬀect of “decisive
victory” frames in boosting conﬁdence that the government will enact its
policy programme should be stronger for subjects who voted for the Tories
than for those who cast a ballot for any of the other parties. By contrast, exposure
2More generally, prior research shows that electoral “winners” and “losers” diﬀer with respect to a number
of politically relevant attitudes such as satisfaction with democracy, evaluations of leaders and policies,
and in the way in which their process political information (Dahlberg and Linde 2016; Kernell and Mul-
linix 2018).
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to “narrow victory” frames will have a larger negative eﬀect on expectations
among “electoral losers” than among “winners”.3
Besides individuals’ partisan aﬃliations and vote choices, we expect the
eﬀect of news about the magnitude of Conservatives’ electoral victory to
depend on the credibility subjects assign to the source of this information.
Individuals tend to believe in the accuracy of information coming from jour-
nalists and outlets they trust (Miller and Krosnick 2000), and thus, will be
willing to accept their interpretation of the electoral outcome. By contrast,
subjects should be less prone to base their political judgments on stories
coming from sources they deem unreliable or on interpretations they perceive
as biased. Consequently, hypothesis H4 states that subjects’ opinions will be
(less) more responsive to information about the decisiveness or narrowness of
the Tory victory when it comes from a source they (dis)trust. This hypothesis is
also in accordance with Druckman (2001) and Baum and Gussin (2004),
who ﬁnd that the probability of accepting or rejecting a message – and
thus, the eﬀectiveness of a frame – can hinge on the (perceived) reputation
of the source, rather than on its content.
Finally, we expect subjects’ level of political knowledge or sophistication to
intervene between the perceived decisiveness of the in-party’s victory and
expectations about the government’s ability to fulﬁl its policy commitments.
Krosnick and Kinder (1990) note that higher levels of political knowledge
reduce the novelty of new information and thus the impact this information
has on the attitudes of more knowledgeable individuals. In our case, more
sophisticated subjects were probably better informed about the outcome
and implications of the 2015 election, so their opinions should be less malle-
able than those of less politically attentive individuals. Furthermore, drawing
on Gomez and Wilson (2001), “high sophisticates” should be better equipped
to understand the complexity of the policy-making process and to recognise
that, even if incumbents are willing to enact the policies they promised, their
ability to do so may depend on other political and contextual factors besides
the margins of victory. Therefore, holding the content of the message con-
stant, we expect more politically sophisticated subjects to be less susceptible to
framing eﬀects than less knowledgeable individuals (H5).
It is worth noting that Miller and Krosnick (2000), in contrast, argue that a
relatively high degree of political expertise is required for individuals to be
able to read beyond the explicit contents of a story, extract its fundamental
implications, and incorporate them into their political judgments. Drawing
on these authors, the opinions of more politically knowledgeable subjects
should be more responsive to treatment than those of low sophisticates.
3Note that, while H3 is a variant of H2, the fact that one of these hypotheses is/is not supported by the data
does not imply that the other will hold as well/not hold either. About 10% of the Tory voters in our
sample did not self-identify as Conservatives, and almost 60% of the “electoral losers” were not
Labour identiﬁers.
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We believe, however, that the association between the magnitude of the in-
party’s victory and government policy performance is a quintessential
example of what Gomez and Wilson (2001, 900) denote as “proximal” or
obvious causal attributions, which require relatively low cognitive skills.
Hence, following Gomez and Wilson (2001), H5 posits that low sophisticates
are more likely to assume a direct link between the decisiveness of incum-
bents’ electoral victory and their policy actions than high sophisticates. That
said, our empirical analysis allows assessing the relative validity of the two
competing rationales in the aftermath of the 2015 UK election.4
Research design
To test these hypotheses, we conducted an experiment embedded in an
online survey ﬁelded by the market research ﬁrm Research Now between
28 May and 1 June 2015. The pool of respondents consisted of 1,830 British
citizens.
The ﬁrst part of the survey, common to all participants, gathered infor-
mation about their partisan aﬃliation, electoral participation, vote choice,
levels of political interest, trust in the press and the media, news consumption
habits, and socio-demographic characteristics.5 Individuals were then ran-
domly assigned to one of four treatments or to a control group.
Subjects in the ﬁrst two treatment groups were exposed to abridged ver-
sions of news reports about the election published either by The Guardian or
The Telegraph, two broadsheets with opposite ideological leanings that are
among Britain’s most prominent and widely circulated newspapers (Cowley
and Kavanagh 2016). The two articles consisted of text only, clearly identiﬁed
the source of the information (the newspaper where each article appeared),
and diﬀered in their description of the electoral outcome and in their
interpretation of the political consequences of this result. The Guardian
piece emphasised the unexpected nature of the voting returns and high-
lighted that the “tumultuous” election had given the Conservative party
only a few more seats than the number required for a majority in the
House of Commons. The Telegraph article, on the other hand, underlined
that the Tories had secured an “outright majority” allowing them to govern
without the need to form a coalition (see Figures A1 and A2 in the Online
Appendix). Additionally, while The Guardian compared the number of Conser-
vative seats against the 326-seat benchmark required for an overall majority,
The Telegraph used 323 seats as the baseline – which takes into consideration
4Miller and Krosnick (2000) further contend that political knowledge and media trust simultaneously mod-
erate the eﬀect of news exposure. Speciﬁcally, they argue that media eﬀects are greatest among citizens
who are both highly knowledgeable and highly trusting of the media. We also test this claim in our
empirical analysis.
5The deﬁnition and coding for these variables can be found in the Online Appendix (Section A1).
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the Speaker’s abstention and the fact that Sinn Féin MPs have historically
refused to take their places in Parliament. This might further boost the per-
ceived decisiveness of the Tory win among subjects allocated to this
second treatment, which we denote “Decisive victory with The Telegraph as
source”, vis-à-vis those in the “Narrow victory with The Guardian as source”
condition.
Because these ﬁrst two treatments used real news stories, congruence
between the source and tone of the stimuli was not manipulated: The Guar-
dian consistently gave the relatively left-wing spin on the 2015 election,
while The Telegraph systematically framed the results in ways that
reinforced the Conservative Party’s narrative (Cowley and Kavanagh 2016).
Using real news articles as stimuli is in line with prior work underscoring
the inﬂuence of the (print) media on public interpretations of electoral out-
comes (Mendelsohn 1998), and should help assuage concerns about “overly
strong or atypical” treatments in survey experiments (Barabas and Jerit
2010, 227).
The limitation of this approach is that it does not allow disentangling the
eﬀect of the content of a message from that of the source and its trustworthi-
ness. Hence, we also constructed two mock news articles that portrayed the
Conservative victory as either narrow or decisive, but removed any element
that would allow subjects to identify the source of the information. These ﬁcti-
tious article excerpts were created based on a content analysis of media
reports about the electoral outcome (Banducci et al. 2018), and looked
similar to real newspaper articles (Figures A3 and A4, Online Appendix). We
refer to these two additional treatments as “Narrow victory with no source”
and “Decisive victory with no source”, respectively.
To assess whether the news stories associated with each of the four
treatments actually conveyed diﬀerent information about the decisiveness
of the Conservative victory, we ran a series of manipulation checks
through the CrowdFlower crowdsourcing platform (www.crowdﬂower.
com). As we show in the Online Appendix (Section A2), the Tory victory
was perceived as signiﬁcantly more decisive by CrowdFlower contributors
randomly allocated to the “Decisive victory with The Telegraph as source”
and the “Decisive victory with no source” treatments than by those who
read the articles corresponding to the “Narrow victory with The Guardian
as source” and “Narrow victory with no source” conditions. On the other
hand, perceptions were statistically indistinguishable between contributors
who read the two articles portraying the victory as decisive (with and
without an identiﬁable source), as well as between those exposed to the
two “narrow victory” frames. This pre-test also failed to uncover systematic
diﬀerences in the eﬀectiveness of the messages associated with the four
treatments.
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Finally, the control group received a “placebo” story concerning the recruit-
ment of a new chief executive by Whitbread (a large UK leisure group) taken
from The Times (see Figure A5 in the Online Appendix). Table A1 in the Online
Appendix summarises the distribution of subjects across the ﬁve experimental
– treatment and control – conditions.
After reading the articles, participants were asked the following question:
“To what extent do you agree/disagree that the Conservative government
will be able to fulﬁl all of its campaign promises?” Responses were coded
on a 5-point ascending scale, ranging from “Strongly Disagree” (1) to “Strongly
Agree” (5). We estimated the diﬀerences in the probability of agreeing/
strongly agreeing with this statement between respondents allocated to
each of the four treatments and those in the control group, and assessed
the moderating inﬂuence of partisanship, vote choice, trust in the press/
media and political sophistication on the treatment eﬀects.
Before discussing our results, it is important to comment on the exter-
nal validity of our study. As noted by Barabas and Jerit (2010), the implau-
sibility of eﬀects and lack of realism are common criticisms levelled
against survey experiments. However, the authors argue that concerns
about generalisability should be mitigated when studying public opinion
reactions to information about events that received substantial media
attention, as was certainly the case of the 2015 UK general election.
Although the fact that the electoral outcome was quite unexpected (Hill
2015) could in principle have rendered subjects more susceptible to treat-
ment manipulations (Kernell and Mullinix 2018), the experiment was con-
ducted at least three weeks after the results were known. Coupled with
the ample media coverage of the election, this meant that participants
had considerable time to update their opinions about the new political
landscape. On the other hand, these considerations point to possible
“pre-treatment eﬀects” (Druckman and Leeper 2012, 875) in our study.
As we discuss in the conclusions, this would, if anything, bias the data
against our hypotheses.
Empirical analysis
We start by examining hypothesis H1. Figure 1 plots diﬀerences in the average
probability of agreeing/strongly agreeing with the statement “the Conserva-
tive government will be able to fulﬁl all of its campaign promises” under
each treatment vis-à-vis the control condition, based on the estimates from
an (unconditional) ordered logit model.6
6The results remain similar if we dichotomise participants’ responses and ﬁt a binary logit, as well as if we
treat the dependent variable as continuous and estimate treatment eﬀects by ordinary least squares
(Table A8 and Figure A8, Online Appendix).
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Exposure to the “Decisive victory with The Telegraph as source” treatment
increased the average probability of agreeing or strongly agreeing with the
above statement by more than 4.5 percentage points, from 25.5% for partici-
pants who read the “placebo” story to 30.1% for subjects allocated to this con-
dition. None of the other treatment eﬀects was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
The evidence in Figure 1 provides some support for H1 and, more gener-
ally, for the mandate theory of elections. In line with the mandate interpret-
ation, subjects who read that the Conservatives had achieved a decisive
victory were systematically more likely to believe that the incoming govern-
ment would be able to implement the policies it promised, vis-à-vis those
who read the “placebo” story. However, this happened only when the
article underscoring the decisiveness of the result appeared in The Telegraph.
The eﬀect of exposure to an “anonymous” but otherwise similar message was
statistically indistinguishable from zero. Our expectation that “narrow” frames
would render subjects less likely to believe in the government’s ability to fulﬁl
its manifesto pledges was not borne out by the data either, regardless of
whether participants received an article published in The Guardian or in an
unidentiﬁable news outlet.
To test hypothesis H2, we extended our baseline model to include inter-
actions between treatments and indicators for Conservative and Labour iden-
tiﬁers, with independents – i.e. participants who stated they were not close to
any political party – as the reference category.7 The upper panel of Figure 2
Figure 1. Eﬀect of the perceived decisiveness of the Tory victory on expectations about
the government’s ability to fulﬁl its campaign promises.
7Subjects aﬃliated with other parties were excluded from this analysis.
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displays the estimates from this ordered logit model, broken down by
partisanship.8
Labour identiﬁers who read the article from The Guardian were 3.4 percen-
tage points less likely to agree/strongly agree that the Tories would be able to
deliver on their promises than those in the control group. However, among
Conservatives and independents, the “Narrow victory with The Guardian as
source” treatment did not signiﬁcantly aﬀect expectations about government
vis-à-vis the control condition. Although these results are broadly aligned with
our second hypothesis, the moderating inﬂuence of partisanship on treat-
ment eﬀects was quite limited overall. Contrary to H2, the eﬀect of the
“Narrow victory with no source” treatment was not signiﬁcantly stronger for
Labour supporters than for Conservatives or independents. Additionally,
neither of the two “decisive frames” was more eﬀective in boosting conﬁ-
dence that the government would deliver on its promises among Conserva-
tives than among independents or Labour partisans. In fact, accounts of a
“decisive” electoral outcome only had a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect among
independents, and only when the article was published in The Telegraph.
The “Decisive victory with The Telegraph as source” treatment raised non-
Figure 2. Moderating inﬂuence of partisanship and vote choice on treatment eﬀects.
8Kam and Trussler (2017) show that, when assessing how non-randomly assigned variables like partisan-
ship condition treatment eﬀects, it is important to account for the potential confounding inﬂuence of
other background characteristics. Following these authors, this speciﬁcation controls for participants’
age, education, gender, ethnicity, marital status, union membership, political interest, news consump-
tion habits, trust in newspapers, and turnout (Table A9, Online Appendix). Hence, these estimates
(and all those presented below) represent average treatment eﬀects conditional on covariates.
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partisans’ probability of agreeing/strongly agreeing that the government
would be able to fulﬁl its campaign promises by 5 percentage points relative
to the placebo story.
We must note that partisan biases did shape subjects’ expectations about
elected oﬃcials. In each of the ﬁve experimental conditions, Conservatives
were systematically (and around 50 percentage points) more likely to
believe that the government would be able to implement its manifesto
pledges than Labour identiﬁers, with independents always occupying the
middle ground between the two partisan groups (Figure A9, Online Appen-
dix). Nonetheless, there is little support for the hypothesis that partisan attach-
ments systematically conditioned subjects’ propensity to accept information
congruent with their preferred party’s narrative or to discard disconﬁrming
messages. Instead, our results suggest that partisanship pre-determined sub-
jects’ opinions about the government’s ability to fulﬁl its promises in such a
way that additional information about the size of the Conservative victory
had little impact on their judgments.
The bottom panel of Figure 2, in turn, allows testing hypothesis H3. This
lower panel summarises the estimates from an ordered logit model interact-
ing the treatment indicators with a dummy for individuals who voted for the
winning party, with respondents who cast a ballot for any other party grouped
in the reference category.9 Subjects who voted either for the Conservatives or
for any of the “electoral losers” were essentially impervious to information
about the decisiveness of the Tory victory, contradicting H3. As we show in
the Online Appendix (Figure A10), “electoral winners” were much more
likely to believe/strongly believe in incumbents’ ability to enact their pro-
posed policies than other voters, regardless of the particular message they
were exposed to. The probability that a subject who voted for the Tories
was conﬁdent that the government would deliver on its manifesto pledges
exceeded 0.5 under every experimental condition. The corresponding prob-
ability dropped to 0.12–0.15 among “electoral losers”. Hence, the opinions
of “winners” and “losers” were not signiﬁcantly altered either by messages
that reinforced their biases or by information challenging their prior beliefs.
Instead, their electoral preferences trumped any information about the deci-
siveness or narrowness of the in-party’s win. Altogether, the evidence in
Figure 2 reveals that, while party identiﬁcation and vote choice strongly
inﬂuenced expectations about the policy actions of the government, these
factors played a limited role in conditioning subjects’ receptiveness to alterna-
tive descriptions of the size of the Conservative victory.
The ﬁnding that the “decisive victory” message had a signiﬁcant eﬀect
when published by The Telegraph – a reputable and widely-circulated
9The sample is restricted to subjects who voted in 2015. This model incorporates the same controls as the
one in the upper panel.
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newspaper – but not in an unknown outlet suggests that media trust might
have exerted a relevant role intervening between treatment exposure and
expectations about government’s policy-making performance, as posited by
hypothesis H4.10 A strong conditioning impact of trust in the press may
also explain why the “Narrow victory with The Guardian as source” treatment
signiﬁcantly undermined Labour identiﬁers’ conﬁdence that the government
would honour its policy commitments in Figure 2, while the “Narrow victory
with no source” condition did not.
These claims ﬁnd limited conﬁrmation in the data, though. This is illus-
trated in Figure 3, which displays average treatment eﬀects by levels of
trust in the accuracy and fairness of newspapers’ political coverage.11
For participants with no conﬁdence in the press, the “Narrow victory with
no source” treatment signiﬁcantly lowered expectations about the Tories’
ability to fulﬁl their electoral promises vis-à-vis the control condition. A
similar message published in The Guardian had no impact on these subjects’
judgments. This suggests that individuals who distrusted the press assigned
lower credibility to an article published by a well-known broadsheet than to
the same story appearing in an unidentiﬁable outlet. Nonetheless, the
opinions of these subjects were equally unresponsive to the two “decisive
victory” frames regardless of the source. Among subjects more inclined to
believe in the accuracy of newspapers’ political coverage, the articles
Figure 3. Moderating inﬂuence of trust in the press on treatment eﬀects.
10The Telegraph was in fact perceived as the most credible source in our pre-test (Table A7, Online
Appendix).
11This model includes the same controls as previous speciﬁcations (Table A10, Online Appendix).
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published in The Telegraph and The Guardian did not have a signiﬁcantly
stronger eﬀect on expectations than their “anonymous” counterparts.
Like partisanship and vote choice, trust in the press had a sizable “direct” or
unconditional inﬂuence on subjects’ beliefs. The average probability of agree-
ing/strongly agreeing with the statement “the Conservative government will
be able to fulﬁl all of its campaign promises” was 7–15 percentage points
lower for individuals with no conﬁdence in newspapers than for those with
higher trust levels in all experimental conditions (Figure A11, Online Appen-
dix). However, Figure 3 shows that trust in newspapers did not aﬀect subjects’
receptivity to information about the decisiveness of the Tory victory. The same
conclusion holds when considering the conditioning impact of trust in the
mass media – newspapers, TV and radio – more generally (Figure A12,
Online Appendix).
While – drawing on Miller and Krosnick (2000) – the above results focus on
the moderating inﬂuence of generalised trust in the press and the media, we
also assessed whether frequent readers of The Telegraph and The Guardian
were more susceptible to messages published in their favourite broadsheet
and/or less sensitive to information printed in the other paper. Although
our survey does not measure trust in these speciﬁc newspapers, it is reason-
able to assume that readers should have more conﬁdence in the electoral
interpretation proposed by their preferred news source than by that put
forward by a paper known to have the opposite editorial line. However,
there are no consistent variations in treatment eﬀects between readers of
The Telegraph and The Guardian, or between these and other subjects
(Table A10, Online Appendix).
By contrast, the relevance of political sophistication as a treatment eﬀect
moderator is decidedly backed by the empirical analysis. This is apparent
from Figure 4, which reports estimates from ordinary logistic models testing
hypothesis H5. Following Kernell and Mullinix (2018), these models include
interactions between treatment indicators and three well-known correlates
of sophistication: political interest, news consumption, and education.12
None of the treatments swayed politically knowledgeable subjects’ beliefs
about the ability of incumbents to keep their campaign promises vis-à-vis the
control condition. Compared to the placebo story, though, news articles por-
traying the Tory victory as “decisive” signiﬁcantly boosted less sophisticated
participants’ conﬁdence that the government would enact its policy pro-
gramme. The upper-left panel of Figure 4 shows that, among subjects with
little interest in politics, those allocated to the “Decisive victory with The Tele-
graph as source” treatment were 3.2 percentage points more likely to agree/
strongly agree that the Tories would be able to fulﬁl their policy commitments
12These speciﬁcations also incorporate socio-demographic, political and attitudinal controls (Table A11,
Online Appendix).
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than those assigned to the control group. Similarly, the “Decisive victory with
no source” treatment raised the likelihood of agreeing/strongly agreeing with
the above statement by more than 15 percentage points among subjects who
rarely followed political news (middle-left panel), and by more than 3 points
among participants without college education (bottom-left panel).13
In the same direction, Figure A13 in the Online Appendix shows that, com-
pared to “high sophisticates”, less politically knowledgeable participants were
signiﬁcantly more prone to believe (doubt) that the Tories would honour their
commitments when exposed to “decisive” (“narrow”) victory frames. The mag-
nitudes of these diﬀerences were quite sizable. For instance, among subjects
assigned to the “Narrow victory with no source” treatment, those who usually
paid little or no attention to politics were half as likely to believe that the gov-
ernment would deliver on its promises as more politically interested partici-
pants. At the other extreme, subjects in the “Decisive victory with no
source” condition who did not regularly follow the news were three times
more likely to believe that the Conservatives would implement their policy
programme than sophisticated subjects who received the same message.
We do not observe diﬀerences in opinions by levels of political sophistication
in the control group.
These results lend credence to the claim that “low sophisticates”were more
sensitive to framing eﬀects than politically knowledgeable subjects, as stated
in H5.14 Moreover, while H1 was only partially corroborated for the full sample
of participants, the relationship between the perceived decisiveness of the
Figure 4. Moderating inﬂuence of political sophistication on treatment eﬀects.
13For ease of exposition, the proxies for political sophistication were dichotomised in Figure 4. The con-
clusions are robust to alternative operationalisations of these variables (see the Online Appendix).
14We also examined the joint moderating impact of political sophistication and media trust. Contrary to
Miller and Krosnick (2000), we ﬁnd no evidence of stronger treatment eﬀects among subjects who were
both highly trusting and politically knowledgeable (Figures A14 and A15, Online Appendix).
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Tory victory and expectations about the government’s policy behaviour pos-
tulated in that ﬁrst hypothesis clearly holds at the lowest levels of sophisti-
cation. The ﬁnding that the mandate theory prevailed among less politically
knowledgeable subjects is particularly relevant in view of the argument that
public perceptions of an electoral mandate embolden incumbents to exercise
a mandate in practice (Grossback, Peterson, and Stimson 2006; Shamir,
Shamir, and Sheafer 2008). To the extent that “low sophisticates” comprise
the vast majority of the public (Krosnick and Kinder 1990), the estimates in
Figures 4 and A13 suggest that alternative accounts of the decisiveness of
incumbents’ victory may aﬀect not only expectations about governments’
policy actions, but also the policies actually enacted. The framing of an elec-
toral outcome in a given waymay thus be, as Mendelsohn (1998, 242) puts it, a
“self-fulling prophecy”.
Concluding remarks
While a few studies have investigated the relationship between narrowness of
the incoming party victory and government policy-making, virtually no work
has examined how perceptions of the decisiveness of incumbents’ electoral
victory shape public conﬁdence in oﬃceholders’ ability to fulﬁl their policy
promises. This paper provides a ﬁrst step in this direction, focusing on the
2015 UK general election.
The results of our survey experiment indicate that, when the in-party’s
victory was portrayed as decisive, subjects – especially less politically sophis-
ticated ones – became more likely to believe that the government would
implement its policy programme. Although partisanship and media trust
also aﬀected expectations about government policy behaviour, these
factors pre-disposed participants to either believe or doubt that the govern-
ment would deliver on its campaign promises, outweighing any information
about the decisiveness of the electoral victory rather than conditioning how
such information was interpreted. In no case do we ﬁnd evidence that portray-
ing the Tory win as narrow enhanced participants’ conﬁdence that incum-
bents would honour their policy commitments. Our results thus favour the
mandate – over the normative – view of elections, at least with respect to
how the (perceived) decisiveness of the incumbent party’s victory inﬂuences
voters’ expectations about government policy-making.
These ﬁndings also have potentially relevant implications for electoral
accountability. Healy and Malhotra (2013) outline a necessary four-step
loop in maintaining accountability: voters (1) observe real world policy out-
comes, (2) attribute responsibility for these outcomes to political actors, (3)
evaluate the performance of responsible oﬃceholders with respect to the
outcomes, and (4) feed these assessments into their vote choices in sub-
sequent elections, thereby inﬂuencing the formation of policy. Importantly,
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accountability in this model is maintained through successive elections,
while our focus was on exploring how citizens develop expectations about
government’s ability to deliver policy outcomes depending on how incum-
bents’ electoral victory is portrayed. Nonetheless, voters may not blame
incumbents for policy failures if they only managed to achieve a slim
majority (step 2), whereas large victories may heighten expectations about
the in-party’s performance (step 3). Given that accountability is maintained
over successive elections, these baseline expectations about responsibility
and performance may alter overall performance evaluations and attributions
of responsibility at the next election.
We end by discussing some caveats to our ﬁndings. First, our treated sub-
jects were exposed to a single message regarding the outcome of the 2015 UK
election: they were told that the Tory win had been either decisive or narrow.
Chong and Druckman (2007) note that, in competitive democracies like
Britain, individuals have access to alternative arguments representing oppos-
ing positions and portraying the same events in diﬀerent – even antithetic –
ways. They argue that competition between frames prompts more conscious
information processing and integration of opposing viewpoints, moderating
individuals’ opinions vis-à-vis situations in which they are only exposed to
one-sided communications. Similarly, Barabas and Jerit (2010) maintain that
pristine experimental designs that ignore the competing messages individ-
uals are exposed to in “real-life” may exaggerate the power of the stimuli.
However, none of these authors maintains that exposure to conﬂicting per-
spectives precludes framing eﬀects. Rather, as Barabas and Jerit (2010)
point out, survey experiments provide an approximation to what treatment
eﬀects might look like in the real world. This approximation works better,
they claim, for events that received a substantial amount of coverage in mul-
tiple outlets and over an extended period of time.
Because our survey was administered three weeks after the high-proﬁle
2015 election, most of the participants were probably exposed to ample
news coverage and – in all likelihood – competing messages about the
result. More than a third of our subjects reported they had been following
the TV political coverage every day in the weeks before the experiment,
and almost 90% of them had done so at least once a week. Since television
news in Britain is constrained by fair coverage rules (Banducci et al. 2018), it
is reasonable to assume that the majority of these individuals were exposed
to alternative interpretations of the electoral outcome. This should mitigate
concerns that subjects were “conﬁned to a single perspective” (Chong and
Druckman 2007, 637), even if our experimental design did not include a
manipulation in which they were exposed to competing frames. Furthermore,
28% of the participants allocated to the “narrow victory” treatments regularly
read conservative newspapers like The Telegraph, The Sun or The Daily Mail,
while 12% of those assigned to the “decisive victory” conditions were frequent
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readers of left-leaning papers like The Guardian and The Mirror. Hence, at least
these subjects – comprising 15% of our sample – were certainly exposed to
conﬂicting descriptions about the decisiveness of the Tory victory.
If anything, these arguments suggest that the opinions of a considerable
fraction of our subjects may have already been moulded, solidiﬁed or
swayed by the plethora of political information available before receiving
the treatments. To paraphrase Barabas and Jerit (2010, 238), these subjects
had already been – repeatedly – “treated” before being exposed to our exper-
imental manipulations, and it is doubtful that one additional exposure would
substantively alter their opinions. The likely consequence of this “pretreat-
ment contamination” (Druckman and Leeper 2012, 875) is that the estimated
eﬀects of our manipulations understate the “true” size of framing eﬀects. The
fact that these eﬀects are signiﬁcant – and, in some cases, quite large – despite
their downward bias bolsters our conﬁdence in the robustness of our ﬁndings
and in the external validity of our main conclusions.
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